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FROM CASE METHOD TO PROBLEM METHOD: 
THE EVOLUTION OF A TEACHER 
MYRON MOSKOVITZ* 
This is the story of a law teacher’s odyssey—from case method to problem 
method—and why. 
I.  IN THE BEGINNING 
Many a year ago, while peacefully practicing law, I was lured into a law 
professorship by a wily professor who turned my head with three persuasive 
arguments: June, July, and August. 
My mother was not enthused about my new career plans.  “You learned to 
be a lawyer by going to law school.  But who taught you how to teach?  
You’ve never taken any education classes.”  Mothers.  I laughed.  “Mom, you 
don’t get it.  I’m not teaching third grade.  This is law school, graduate school.  
I’ll be teaching grown-ups.  They already know how to put away their 
crayons.”  She gave me the look.  “So, Perfesser?  How will you teach them?”  
Good question—to which I hadn’t given much thought.  “Well, the same way I 
was taught, I guess.  The case method.” 
Though I had attained a bit of prominence in Property Law, the dean 
assigned me to teach Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure.  I had little 
experience in these areas, but the dean was short of teachers in those courses 
that year.  Such are the ways of deans. 
I perused the various casebooks.  They seemed quite similar to each other: 
a case, then a few notes, maybe a “hypo” or two, then on to the next case.  The 
cases in each chapter were from various jurisdictions and were not presented 
chronologically.  They were pretty much the same type of casebooks I used in 
every course I took in law school (Boalt Hall, during the 1960s) and were well-
suited to the case method of instruction. 
So I chose a criminal law book and a criminal procedure book and taught 
my courses by the case method, dutifully marching from case to case in the 
time-honored way.  My students seemed OK with it, as this is what they were 
getting in their other courses.  This was, to them, “law school”—a rather 
peculiar hurdle to jump on their path to doing what they really wanted to do: 
practice law.  After they passed the bar exam, then they would learn what 
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lawyers really do.  Reading cases would be part of this, but only a small part.  
Many students already knew from their clerking jobs that lawyers don’t spend 
much time reading cases the way we go through them under the case method.  
This is one reason why second- and third-year students become bored with 
classes.  They humor us, while chomping at the bit to get law school behind 
them. 
After a couple years of this, I became increasingly uncomfortable.  “I know 
what lawyers really do—and it’s not this,” I mulled to myself.  Lawyers read 
cases, of course, but mainly as tools to help solve their clients’ problems.  
That’s what I should be teaching my students to do.  That’s what they need, 
and that’s what they’d like. 
But how could I replicate in the classroom what lawyers do in their 
offices? 
II.  PREPARING THE PROBLEMS 
I could not, of course, bring a real client into a classroom of eighty 
students.  But I could bring in an imaginary client with a story I made up.  In a 
way, this is even better than a real client.  While clients ramble on in all 
directions, I could control the story.  I could invent a tight little tale that raised 
only the issues I wanted raised, in a way that challenged the students to 
organize and analyze the issues as a good lawyer might. 
To develop the story, I started by reading each case in a chapter of the 
criminal law casebook I was using, noting the key issues.  I then wrote a rather 
complex story that raised those issues, ending with a tag line such as, “Our 
client has asked us whether he should spend a lot of money to appeal his 
conviction.  He wants to know whether an appellate court would affirm or 
reverse.  Please tell me what to advise him.  Assume the court will base its 
decision on the cases set out in Chapter 4 of the casebook.”  This problem was 
more than a “hypothetical.”  It raised not one but several issues, cutting across 
the entire chapter.  An analysis of the problem required sorting out the issues 
and organizing them into an outline, and the outline had to be based on a pretty 
good understanding of the cases. 
I found it important to write my own answer, or at least a detailed outline 
of an answer, to each problem before giving it to the class.  This helped ensure 
that the problem raised the issues I wanted to raise (some of them close or 
complicated) and avoided issues I did not want to raise.  My foresight was not 
perfect, of course, and I often found myself readjusting the problem (or the 
answer) before giving it to next year’s class.  This project took some time and 
mental energy, but, as things turned out, it was well worth it. 
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III.  IN CLASS 
I gave the problem to the students a few days before the class in which I 
intended to discuss it.  I told them how to do their homework: read the problem 
first and then read the cases in the chapter to which the problem related.  I told 
them to draft an outline of an answer to the problem as they went along, 
changing and refining the outline as they came across new cases and rules.  
They should bring their final outline to class—not to turn in, but as a possible 
basis for discussion. 
I would begin each class with a very short lecture introducing the topic, 
and then go straight to the problem.  I’d ask a student to orally present an 
outline, which I would write on the board.  Invariably, there was some 
mistake—major or minor.  I would ask the class what was right or wrong about 
the outline, and the mistakes would be revealed.  I would ask for some 
“authority” for their position, and they would respond by leading us to the 
relevant case.  We would then discuss the case, in a manner similar to the case 
method. 
Ironically, this case method portion of problem analysis worked better 
under the problem method.  When teaching using the case method, professors 
are often frustrated.  Profs want students to understand the facts and the court’s 
rationale.  But many students want just the holding—the “black letter rule” that 
they “need to know for the exam.”  When we examine cases under the problem 
method, students see a need to understand the case on a deeper level—they 
can’t solve the problem (i.e., predict how a court will rule) unless they really 
understand the case.  Students realize that the “black letter” rule is often not 
clear enough to enable them to predict how a court would resolve the problem.  
They must also “distinguish facts” and consider whether a rule’s rationale 
would be furthered or impeded by a ruling in our client’s favor. 
After discussing a case, we would come right back to the problem and 
adjust the outline.  When we get a major section of the outline about right, we 
then apply that section to the facts of the problem.  This often requires us to go 
back and examine the cases even more carefully, because the bottom line we 
are seeking—a prediction of how a court would resolve the problem—might be 
revealed only by seeing exactly what the courts have done before and why they 
did it.  We must take a good look not only at what the court said (often in 
vague language), but also at what it said it about.  The specific facts of the case 
are often the meat that give meaning to the fuzzy bones of the court’s holding.  
Then we move on to the next section of the outline and do the same. 
There are missteps and confusion along the way.  I permit these to happen, 
and lead students to discover the error of their ways.  This is frustrating for 
some, but most see the value in the struggle.  I occasionally remind them that 
when they get out in practice, I won’t be there to hold their hands, so they’d 
better learn how to solve the problems on their own.  At the end of the class, 
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however, I present them with a pretty clear picture of how I would analyze the 
problem—although if the bottom line (the “conclusion”) is not clear, I tell 
them so.  Sometimes that’s just the way the world is.  And that’s how I wrote 
some parts of the problem—deliberately. 
IV.  WRITING A PROBLEM METHOD BOOK: CRIMINAL LAW 
After a few years of this, I decided to take the next logical step—writing 
problems for a case-method casebook, which was like putting a lawnmower 
motor on a bicycle.  It works, sort of, but you can’t really call it a motorcycle.  
I would write my own criminal law book specially designed for the problem 
method. 
My goal was to present students with the task of a prosecutor, criminal 
defense lawyer, or judge, within the natural limits imposed by the need to teach 
a large group of law students within a finite number of classes.  My first job 
was to select the cases.  I’ve been blessed (or cursed) with a rather bizarre 
imagination, so I can invent any type of problem.  But I can’t invent good, 
interesting cases.  So I’d adapt a problem to a group of cases rather than the 
other way around. 
How does a lawyer select cases?  By looking mainly within the jurisdiction 
in which the crime occurred because the court is more likely to consider those 
cases as precedent.  So on any given topic, I looked for the most interesting 
and instructive cases within a single jurisdiction.  I scanned the entire country, 
looking for the best cluster in a single jurisdiction on a given topic (attempt, 
self-defense, etc.).  For example, after a bit of work, I chose New York as the 
site of my chapter on larceny because that state had some rather recent cases 
applying the old elements of larceny (taking, asportation, intent to steal, etc.) to 
some modern situations, such as whether turning on a car’s ignition is “taking” 
the car, whether a shoplifter “takes possession” of an item in a supermarket 
when he removes the item from the shelf but before he leaves the store with it, 
and whether a money-counting firm “takes” a bank client’s money by investing 
it for a few hours before returning it to the bank.  For contrast, I included a few 
notes summarizing relevant, interesting cases from other jurisdictions, but the 
focus was on New York.  To give students the full picture, I set out some New 
York statutes on larceny. 
The problem, then the statutes, then the cases are presented in 
chronological order with notes, so that students can see how the law 
developed.  I set up every chapter of the book this way.  As I told my students, 
“You have pretty much everything a real lawyer has to work with.  I’ve done 
your legal research for you, but the rest is up to you.”  Then on to the next 
chapter—another topic, another jurisdiction.  The robbery chapter focuses on 
Pennsylvania cases, the felony murder chapter on California cases, the attempt 
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chapter on federal cases, and so on.  Every chapter begins with a problem.1  To 
help professors who decided to use my book (including, of course, me), I wrote 
a teacher’s manual.  Each chapter of the manual begins with my rather detailed 
outline of an analysis of the problem, followed by summaries of the major 
cases in the chapter. 
V.  AN EXAMPLE 
Here is how the problem method operates: 
The chapter on voluntary manslaughter begins with the following general 
definition: voluntary manslaughter is an intentional homicide committed while 
the defendant is acting in a state of passion induced by a provocation that 
would induce a reasonable person to lose self-control, where neither the 
defendant nor a reasonable person would have cooled off between the 
provocation and the killing. 
Next comes the problem, which reads as follows: 
 
To: My law clerk 
From: New Mexico District Court Judge Luke Warm 
Re: State v. Berkowitz 
 
I am in the middle of trial in this case.  Defendant Brenda Berkowitz is 
charged with the second-degree murder of Ron Ruiz.  The prosecution’s evidence 
showed that Ruiz was killed by a stab wound in the chest, inflicted by Berkowitz. 
 
Berkowitz testified in her own defense.  The transcript of her testimony is 
attached.  Her lawyer wants me to instruct the jury that, if they believe her 
testimony, they may return a verdict of guilty of voluntary manslaughter, instead 
of murder. 
 
Please review the transcript and the attached authorities, and advise me as to 




 1. See MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES AND PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 1999).  
Also see the accompanying teacher’s manual to this textbook.  See also MYRON MOSKOVITZ, 
CASES AND PROBLEMS IN CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW (1999).  Also see the accompanying 
teacher’s manual to this textbook. 
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Transcript of Berkowitz’s Testimony 
 
Q. Ms. Berkowitz, what was your relationship with Mr. Ruiz? 
 
A. We were lovers for about two years, though we did not live together.  We had 
planned to get married next year. 
 
Q. What happened on the evening of May 8? 
 
A. Ron and I were having dinner at his apartment in Santa Fe, and we were 
drinking wine.  Wine doesn’t relax me, but usually makes me rather anxious.  
Over our tamales and chopped liver, Ron told me that he had slept with Joan, my 
best friend.  He also said that he did not want to marry me. 
 
Q. Did he say why? 
 
A. Yes.  He said he didn’t think our ethnic backgrounds went well together, as 
Mexicans were hot and Jews were cold.  I started to cry and protest, and he called 
me a “whining Jewish princess.” 
 
Q. What did you do then? 
 
A. I am very proud of my Jewish heritage, so I became very upset.  I got up and 
walked out.  I walked around the neighborhood for a couple of hours.  When I 
returned to Ron’s apartment, he was asleep on the couch, from drinking the wine, 
I guess.  I went into his bedroom and looked in his desk drawers.  I found a short 
letter to Ron from a woman, dated a couple of years ago, saying how much she 
loved him.  I thought it was from Joan.  I went back into the living room, and Ron 
was still asleep.  I looked at his face.  He seemed so calm, even though he had 
hurt me so much.  This really infuriated me, so I picked up a knife from the 
kitchen sink and stabbed him.  Later, I found out that the letter had been written 
by Ron’s mother. 
 
Next come the cases (and a statute, which says little).  All of the cases in 
this chapter come from New Mexico, and that is where the problem arises. 
Here is a summary of the cases: In State v. Nevares, the court held that the 
victim’s rejection of the defendant as a lover could not furnish adequate 
provocation, because “words alone, however scurrilous or insulting, will not 
furnish the adequate provocation” necessary for voluntary manslaughter.2  The 
court also held that the defendant’s “peculiar, even defective, state of mind” 
(because of a head injury) was irrelevant, because a defendant seeking 
 
 2. 7 P.2d 933, 935 (N.M. 1932). 
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mitigation to voluntary manslaughter is held to the standard of an “ordinary 
man of average disposition.”3 
In Sells v. State, the court held that “informational words [here, a wife’s 
confession of adultery], as distinguished from mere insulting words, may 
constitute adequate provocation,” where “a sudden disclosure of an event (the 
event being recognized by the law as adequate) may be the equivalent of the 
event presently occurring.”4  The court also stated “the substance of the 
informational words spoken, the meaning conveyed by those informational 
words, the ensuing arguments and other actions of the parties, when taken 
together, could amount to provocation.”5 
In State v. Munoz, Donna told the defendant (her husband) that Hatfield 
had molested her more than nine years ago.6  This allegedly drove the 
defendant to kill Hatfield.  The court held that the defendant was entitled to a 
voluntary manslaughter instruction even though the information came from 
Donna, not Hatfield, because the actual provocation came from Hatfield, and 
Donna only communicated the information.7 
I begin the class with a brief introduction to the new topic—voluntary 
manslaughter—and then go straight to the problem.  “Ms. Smith, what are the 
main topics in your outline to today’s problem?”  She tells us, and I write them 
on the board.  I then ask the class, “Does everyone agree with this?”  Usually 
someone doesn’t, and we discuss the criticism.  I’ll ask Ms. Smith and her 
critic which case or cases support their positions.  This leads to a discussion of 
those cases, along lines pretty similar to what happens under the case method.  
But then we come back to the problem. 
After we settle on the major issues, we fill in the submajor issues—again 
discussing the relevant cases that students think support the inclusion of these 
issues at this place in the outline.  When done with this (or sometimes in the 
middle), we apply the rules to the facts of the problem.  At the end of the class 
(or maybe two classes), I will have steered them (gradually, with a struggle) to 
the outline I think works best. 
Here, the jury should be instructed on voluntary manslaughter only if the 
defendant’s testimony shows substantial evidence of each of the four elements 
of voluntary manslaughter.  Thus, the outline might look something like this: 
 
 
 3. Id. 
 4. 653 P.2d 162, 164 (N.M. 1982). 
 5. Id. (emphasis added). 
 6. 827 P.2d 1303, 1304-05 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992). 
 7. Id. at 1306. 
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I. Was there a “reasonable provocation”? 
 
A. What goes into “reasonable person” standard?  Nevares says standard is 
“the ordinary man of average disposition.” 
 
1. Intoxication would seem to be irrelevant.  See reasoning of Nevares. 
 
2. Is “ordinary man . . .” sensitive to ethnic slurs? 
 
B. Were R’s words sufficient to provoke reasonable person? 
 
1. Insulting words (“Jewish princess”) not enough.  Sells. 
 
2. Informing words “may be equivalent of the event itself.”  Sells. 
 
a. Info re R not marrying B would not seem to be enough, under 
Nevares. 
 
b. Would info that R was sleeping with J be enough?  Note that 
this was not adulterous, as in Sells. 
 
C. R’s calm look while sleeping? 
 
D. Letter from R’s mother?  Not written by Ron, but perhaps it “counts” 
anyway, as part of accumulation of events.  Compare Munoz. 
 
E. If each act alone insufficient, is a cumulation of acts sufficient?  Sells 
suggests yes. 
 
II. Was B in fact provoked to heat of passion?  Seems so, from her testimony 
that she was “infuriated.”  (Note that her drinking might be relevant to show 
actual provocation, even though not relevant to reasonable provocation.) 
 
III. Would a reasonable person have cooled off in the hour B walked around 
neighborhood? 
 
A. Treatise says that after cooling off, new event may “rekindle” the 
passion of a reasonable person. 
 
B. Here, “new events” were the letter and R sleeping. 
 
IV. Did B in fact not cool off? 
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VI.  MORE BOOKS: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
I followed pretty much the same pattern with Criminal Procedure.  I started 
by writing problems for use with someone else’s casebook for a few years, 
then wrote my own books—one on police practices and the other on the 
adjudicatory phase.  I followed the same scheme described previously, 
beginning each chapter with a problem, followed by cases to be applied to the 
problem.  The police practices book is entirely constitutional law, so it includes 
no statutes.8  The adjudicatory phase book includes some federal rules and 
statutes (for example, regarding bail, speedy trial, and plea bargaining).9 
VII.  FEEDBACK 
Does the problem method “work”? 
Before examining this question, a couple of caveats.  First, I have not been 
able to conduct a proper scientific study—with a control group and test group, 
double blind tests, and the like.  The results I’ll report are pretty 
impressionistic.  Second, it is not easy to test the method as distinct from the 
professor who uses the method.  Feedback about my teaching—positive and 
negative—might say more about me than my method.  It’s safe to say, 
however, that most students do not see me as the cuddly, nurturing type, so 
most positive feedback is probably due more to my method than to my 
sparkling personality. 
Whether a method is successful should be measured by how well it helps 
to reach certain goals.  Here are the law teaching goals I’ve identified: one is to 
keep students reasonably “happy” during the course itself.  Another is to help 
students succeed in law school, by passing enough of their courses to graduate.  
A third goal is to help students pass the state bar exam.  And a final goal—in 
my view, the most important—lies in the future: to help them practice law at 
the highest possible level.  To do this, they need to “think like a lawyer.”  In 
my humble opinion, the problem method is better suited than the case method 
to teaching them this skill. 
VIII.  TEACHING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” 
Law professors are a peculiar breed—half lawyer, half scholar.  Well, 
maybe not half and half.  Most are more scholar than lawyer.  I fall nearer to 
the lawyer end of the spectrum.  While I have scholarly interests, at heart I’m a 
lawyer.  Whether it’s genetic, environmental, or cosmic, I can’t seem to help it.  
Even though I carry a full-time teaching load and publish on a regular basis, I 
 
 8. MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES & PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE POLICE (3d 
ed. 2000).  Also see the accompanying teacher’s manual to this textbook. 
 9. MYRON MOSKOVITZ, CASES & PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: THE COURTROOM 
(3d ed. 2000).  Also see the accompanying teacher’s manual to this textbook. 
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also handle appeals, consult for lawyers, and even get involved in the 
occasional trial.  This helps my teaching and supplements my meager 
academic income; but if truth be told, I just can’t bring myself to abandon my 
true calling. 
This explains a lot about how I choose to teach.  I teach my students to 
think like I think when I practice law.  I often hear case-method professors say 
that they teach students to “think like a lawyer,” but I find this puzzling.  If a 
lawyer were called upon to analyze an appellate opinion objectively, she might 
do something similar to what law professors do under the case method: 
summarize the facts, discern how the case arrived at the appellate court, find 
the holding, etc.  But this is a small part of a lawyer’s job, and the lawyer 
rarely does this for its own sake, rather than as one of several vehicles 
employed to solve a client’s problem.  True, when the lawyer does analyze an 
appellate opinion, the skills learned under the case method can be quite useful.  
But “thinking like a lawyer” usually means thinking about how to use the case, 
a skill case-method profs don’t teach much. 
In a way, this is not surprising, because the founder of the case method saw 
himself as a scientist, not a lawyer.  Dean Langdell sought to raise Harvard 
Law School’s prestige to the same level as Harvard’s science departments.  
The biology department dissected frogs to understand how the body works, so 
Langdell decided to dissect cases in order to understand how “the law” works, 
using Socratic engagement with his students.  Incidentally (and, probably, 
unintentionally), this happened to enhance students’ lawyerly skills in critical 
analysis, quick thinking, and public speaking.  The legal community realized 
that the case method seemed to produce better lawyers than the old method 
(lectures from treatises), so this new method spread throughout the country’s 
law schools.10 
Langdell had fled from law practice.  Many of today’s law professors have 
done the same, in varying degrees.  Tired of “thinking like a lawyer,” they 
prefer to “think like a law professor”—and that’s what they teach their students 
through the case method.  Most do a good job of this, adding real value to their 
students’ potential as lawyers.  But “teaching them to think like a lawyer”?  
Not quite.  That’s what clinical professors do, but large, required classes are 
not suitable for the labor-intensive teaching we reserve for clinics.  The best 
way to teach students in the bigger classes to “think like a lawyer” is the 
problem method. 
 
 10. These events are described in Myron Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It’s Time To 
Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 241, 242-44 (1992). 
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
Since seeing the light, I have been propagating the faith,11 with only 
marginal success, and generally making a nuisance of myself.  Despite my 
efforts, the great majority of American law professors continue to teach using 
the case method.  This is slowly changing, as more problem-method books 
become available and more professors become aware of how the problem 
method can better help their students.  Some day, I hope, the majority of law 
profs will indeed teach their students to “think like lawyers.” 
 
 11. See Moskovitz, supra note 10.  See also Myron Moskovitz, The “Problem Method” of 
Teaching Law, 17 J. JUD. REFORM JAPAN 45 (2001) (in Japanese), translated in 4 WASEDA 
PROCEEDINGS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 75 (2001). 
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